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GADDIS V. SMITH, ATKINS V. CROSLAND
Limitations In Professional Malpractice Actions
Gaddis v. Smith'
Atkins v. Crosland'
In Gaddis, the defendant performed a Caesarean section on plain-
tiff in 1959. Because of increased abdominal pain and fear of a tumor,
plaintiff was operated on in 1963, at which time a surgical sponge left
during the prior surgery was discovered. When suit was filed in 1964,
the defendant raised the defense of limitations, relying on the two year
statute for personal injuries' and the cases construing it.' The trial
court's grant of summary judgment for defendant was affirmed by the
Court of Civil Appeals.' On appeal to the Supreme Court of Texas,
1. 417 S.W.2d 577 (Sup. Ct. Tex. 1967).
2. 417 S.W.2d 150 (Sup. Ct. Tex. 1967).
3. TEx. Ryv. Crv. STAT. art. 5526 (1958).
4. Carrell v. Denton, 138 Tex. 145, 157 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. Comm. App. 1942);
Stewart v. Janes, 393 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
5. The court of civil appeals is the intermediate court of appeals in civil cases.
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the plaintiff attacked the rule enunciated in Carrell v. Denton.' In
Carrell, it was held that a cause of action accrues and the statute com-
mences to run when the incision is closed, rather than when the negli-
gent act is or should have been discovered. The majority,7 in reversing
the lower court decision, expressly overruled Carrell and adopted the
"discovery" rule in "causes of action in which a physician leaves a
foreign object in the body of his patient."'8 Accordingly, the court held
that a cause of action accrued on the date when the plaintiff learned of,
or in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have learned
of, the presence of the foreign object in her body.
The Atkins case also presented a limitations question and was
decided by the Supreme Court of Texas the same day it decided Gaddis.
In Atkins, the plaintiff, who owned and operated service stations, em-
ployed the defendant, an accountant, to prepare his income tax returns.
If a cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting had been
employed, it is undisputed that the plaintiff's income tax liability for
1960 would have been $20,627.69. Under the accrual method of ac-
counting actually used by defendant, the plaintiff's tax liability for
1960 amounted to $8,340.37." In applying the accrual method, how-
ever, defendant failed to obtain from the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue the required permission to change accounting methods.Y This
failure resulted in an assessment in 1961 of $12,287.32, the difference
in amount of tax between the two methods. As in Gaddis, the trial
court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment which was
based on a limitations defense, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed.
Reversing, the court held that the plaintiff had sustained no injury until
the assessment in 1961, and therefore the statute of limitations began
to run from that date. In reaching this decision, the court disapproved
some of the language in the case of Crawford v. Davis" which it deemed
to be in conflict with the instant holding. Crawford was a malpractice
action against an attorney for his delay in instituting suit in which
it was held that the period of limitation began to run at the time
of commission of the negligent act.
Read in conjunction with Gaddis, Atkins' reference to an attorney
malpractice case seems to indicate, with the possible exception of certain
medical acts, an abandonment of the date of the negligent act as a
starting point for the running of the statute of limitations. With these
6. 138 Tex. 145, 157 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. Comm. App. 1942).
7. Justice Griffin dissented, stating that "[tihis 'discovery' doctrine will lead to
hopeless confusion and leave liability open without any limitation 'cut off' point. This
court has no right to pass legislation changing the statute of limitation." 417 S.W.2d
at 583.
8. The court made it clear that its holding was limited to this type of case only:
"It should be noted that our holding here is limited to causes of action in which a
physician leaves a foreign object in the body of his patient." 417 S.W.2d at 581.
9. The difference in amount occurred because the cash receipts method does not
show inventory, while the accrual method does.
10. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 446(e): "REQUIREMENT RESPECTING CHANGIE OF
ACCOUNTINc METHOD. Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, a tax-
payer who changes the method of accounting on the basis of which he regularly
computes his income in keeping his books shall, before computing his taxable income
under the new method, secure the consent of the Secretary or his delegate."
11. 148 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
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decisions Texas has joined a growing number of states which recognize
the essential unfairness of the rule of limitations which prescribes accrual
of the cause of action at the time of the negligent act: "Especially
where the plaintiff is unqualified to ascertain the imperfection, as in
the case of negligent performance of expert or professional services, it
seems harsh to begin the period at the time of defendant's act."' 2
While Gaddis and Atkins do not yet represent the majority rule, this
trend is reflected in the law of nearly every state to some degree.
Statutes of limitations, legislative enactments which prescribe
the periods within which actions may be brought on certain claims,
were virtually unknown in the early common law. With respect to
torts, the only limitation was a product of the maxim "actio personalis
moritur cum persona,"'" the consequent effect being that all personal
actions were confined to the joint lifetime of the parties. Although
originally regarded with little favor,' 4 statutes of limitations have now
become so firmly embedded in our legal system that their function or
application is rarely questioned by either the legislature or the ju-
diciary.'" A rudimentary purpose of these statutes is to afford protec-
tion to defendants against stale claims after a period of time which
ought to be sufficient for a person of ordinary diligence to bring an
action.
The primary consideration underlying such legislation is un-
doubtedly one of fairness to the defendant. There comes a time
when he ought to be secure in his reasonable expectation that the
slate has been wiped clean of ancient obligations, and he ought
not to be called on to resist a claim where the "evidence has been
lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared."'"
The policy of protecting defendants from old claims is not an entirely
convincing justification for the harsh consequences which sometimes
occur as a result of the fact that the limitations defense is a complete
bar to the action. In cases of negligence by professional practitioners,
it has been persuasively contended that patients and clients ought to
be protected from tortious acts which are often of such a nature that
their discovery is improbable within the statutory period.
Undoubtedly influenced by one or the other of these considerations,
courts have availed themselves of various theories to protect or assist
the particular class or party they favor. Notwithstanding some notable
holdouts, the inescapable trend of these decisions is in favor of the
injured plaintiff.
12. Developments in the Law - Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. Rev. 1177,
1201 (1950).
13. "A personal right of action dies with the person." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
47 (4th ed. 1951).
14. H. WOOD, LIMITATION op ACTIONS 5 (1882).
15. In Maryland, for example, there has been no significant legislative change in
250 years. With the exception of minor changes in language, the present statute,
MD. Conz ANN. art. 57, § 1 (1957), is identical to Act of April, 1715, ch. 23, § 2
[1715] Md. Laws.




CHOOSING THE APPLICABLE STATUTE
In ruling on a defense of limitations in professional malpractice
cases, a court is often faced with the initial problem of determining
which, if any, of its statutes of limitations is applicable, since a remedy
at law will be barred by delay in bringing the action only when a
statute of limitations is applicable to that particular remedy. Although
there is some recent authority to the contrary, 7 statutes of limitations
are generally strictly construed.'" In addition, since such statutes can-
not be extended by analogy from one subject to another,19 an action
must come clearly within the ambit of the statute if it is to be barred.2"
Although the questio.n of which potentially applicable statute controls
in a'particular malpractice case usually depends upon the phraseology of
the particular enactment, many courts, construing substantially identical
language, have reached conflicting conclusions. 2' Some states have
specific malpractice statutes of limitations ;2 in those which do not,
the preliminary determination to be made is whether the tort or the
usually longer contract statute is applicable.23
In medical malpractice cases, the overwhelming majority of courts,
holding that substance controls, look behind the pleadings and find that
the suit sounds in tort regardless of allegations of implied contract.24
The following statement of the Kansas court in Travis v. Bishoff2
typifies the approach generally adopted in determining whether the
tort or contract limitations statute applies: "The law of this state is
17. See, e.g., United States v. Satz, 109 F. Supp. 94 (N.D.N.Y. 1952) ; Foremost
Properties v. Gladman, 100 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1958) ; Wentz v. Price Candy Co., 352
Mo. 1, 175 S.W.2d 852 (1943).
18. See, e.g., Skidmore v. Alameda County, 13 Cal. 2d 534, 90 P.2d 577 (1939);
Doughty v. Maine Central Transp. Co., 141 Me. 124, 39 A.2d 758 (1944) ; McMahan
v. Dorchester Fertilizer Co., 184 Md. 155, 40 A.2d 313 (1944).
19. See Anderson v. City of Bridgeport, 134 Conn. 260. 56 A.2d 650 (1948).
20. See, e.g., Grabbe v. Brownell, 247 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1957); McMahan v.Dorchester Fertilizer Co., 184 Md. 155, 40 A.2d 313 (1944); Pugnier v. Ramharter,275 Wis. 70, 81 N.W.2d 38 (1957). Cf. United States v. A.S. Kreider Co., 313 U.S.
443 (1941).
21. In Lakeman v. LaFrance, 102 N.H. 300,156 A.2d 123, 127 (1959) the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire said, speaking of its malpractice statute: "We are of the
opinion that by its terms the two year limitation in RSA 508:4 was intended to apply
to an action of tort for malpractice but not to an action of assumpsit for breach of
contract." Contra, Maercklein v. Smith, 129 Colo. 72, 76, 266 P.2d 1095, 1097 (1954),
commenting on a similar statute: "[A] statute of limitation relating specifically to
those engaged in the practice of healing arts . . . shall govern in all actions against
physicians and surgeons growing out of their practice and regardless of the form
thereof."
22. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 25(1) (1958) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-205 (1962) ; COLO.Riv. STAT. ANN. § 87-1--6 (1953) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-584 (1958); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 2-627 (1946) ; Ky. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 413.140(e) (1963); Mn. RI v. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, ch. 205, § 753 (1964) ; MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 260, § 4 (Supp. 1966) ;
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.605(3) (Supp. 1959) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.07(1) (Supp.1966); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.140 (1952); NPD. Rtv. STAT. § 25-208 (1964); N.H.
Rev. STAT. ANN. § 508:4 (1955); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 50 (McKinney 1963);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18(3) (1960); OHIO Rtv. CODe ANN. § 2305.11; S.D. Conz§ 33.0232 (Supp. 1960). ALA. CODIs tit. 7, § 21 (1958) (Attorney Malpractice).23. In addition there are limitations in many states for assault and battery, per-
sonal injury, and fraud and deceit, which are occasionally applied. See Annot., 80
A.L.R.2d 320, 351 (1961).
24. See, e.g., notes 25 & 27 infra and accompanying text.
25. 143 Kan. 283, 54 P.2d 955 (1936).
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realistic. Substance prevails over form. It is perfectly manifest that,
notwithstanding the form given to the petition [which was contract],
the gravamen of the action was malpractice, which is a tort, and the
action was barred by the two year statute of limitations."2 Similarly,
in Kozan v. Comstock,2" the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
applying Louisiana law, realistically addressed the question:
It is the nature of the duty breached that should determine whether
the action is in tort or in contract. To determine the duty one
must examine the patient-physician relationship. It is true that
usually a consensual relationship exists and the physician agrees
impliedly to treat the patient in a proper manner. Thus, a mal-
practice suit is inextricably bound up with the idea of breach of
implied contract. However, the patient-physician relationship! and
the corresponding duty that is owed, is not one that is completely
dependent upon a contract theory. . . The duty of due care is
imposed by law and is something over and above any contractual
duty. Certainly, a physician could not avoid liability for negligent
conduct by having contracted not to be liable for negligence. The
duty is owed in all cases, and a breach of this duty constitutes a
tort.2
8
Although in the medical context its adherents are steadily decreasing,
a few courts have held that the form of action is decisive. This is
usually the result of an effort to allow the plaintiff to take advantage
of the longer contract period. Sellers v. Noah,29 long the leading case
in support of this approach, has been recently overruled by statute. 30
The court's rationale is worthy of note, however, inasmuch as it clearly
shows the technique used by those courts which have adopted this
position.3 ' In holding that the longer contract statute applied against
a surgeon who had allegedly been negligent in performing an appen-
dectomy on the plaintiff, the Alabama court said: "The counts declare
upon the breach of the surgeon's contract. They are not in tort; the
reference to negligence therein being but descriptive of the method or
means whereby the contract was breached. '32
Generally, however, with the possible exception of a few states, '3
any attempt to set up an implied contract to avoid the tort or malprac-
tice statute will be of no avail. This is not necessarily true when an
26. 143 Kan. 283, 54 P.2d at 956.
27. 270 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1959).
28. Id. at 844.
29. 209 Ala. 103, 95 So. 167 (1923).
30. In 1953 the Alabama legislature passed a malpractice statute which expressly
included tort and contract. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 25 (1958).
31. It appears that Florida is the only state which still allows the plaintiff in
medical cases to choose the nature of the suit by his choice of form. See Manning v.
Serrano, 97 So.2d 688 (Fla. 1957).
32. 209 Ala. 103, 95 So. at 168. Contra, Kuhn v. Brownfield, 34 W. Va. 252,
257, 12 S.E. 519, 521 (1890), stating that the basis of the action is negligence, and
that the implied contract "is only explanatory of how he came to be engaged, and as
raising a duty on his part, and is to be treated as if it were inducement."
33. Florida may be the only one. See note 31 supra.
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express contract to effect a specific result is alleged. In states with
malpractice statutes, it is not always clear whether the express con-
tracts are governed by such statutes, 34 although most courts follow the
Colorado court, which stated in Maercklein v. Smith35 that, "[A]
statute of limitation relating specifically to those engaged in the practice
of the healing arts . . . shall govern in all actions against physicians
and surgeons growing out of their practice and regardless of the form
thereof. 3 6 At least one state treats express contracts as an exception
to the malpractice statute.3 7  In the jurisdictions without malpractice
statutes,"8 some allow recovery on a contract theory where the injury
resulted from the breach of an express contract, independent of the
normal obligations of the physician-patient relationship. 9 The great
majority,4 ° however, simply do not allow recovery on any type of con-
tract theory in medical cases.4'
Even where a contract action is allowed, it is "[a]n entirely un-
satisfactory remedy affording plaintiff only partial relief."42 Recovery
may be had only for the sums expended for medical treatment and other
damage which could be reasonably expected to flow from the breach.
Damages for pain and suffering, or other tort recovery for the unskillful
treatment by the physician, are not included.4"
Although the same preliminary determination must be made by a
court in actions against attorneys and accountants, the results are not
always identical to those reached in medical malpractice cases. Since
only one state has a statute specifically applicable to attorneys,44 the
choice of statute problem must be resolved where there are separate
tort and contract statutes. The substance of the action is controlling
34. In Alabama, Arkansas, Indiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and South Dakota
the malpractice statutes expressly include actions of tort or contract. In these states
there is a strong presumption that all contract actions are included. There is also
a presumption, although not as strong, that in the other jurisdictions the legislatures
intended to consolidate all forms of action by enacting a malpractice statute. See
Lillich, The Malpractice Statute of Limitations in New York and Other Jurisdictions,
47 CORNELL L.Q. 339, 363 (1962).
35. 129 Colo. 72, 266 P.2d 1095 (1954).
36. Id. at 76, 266 P.2d at 1097. See also Barnhoff v. Aldridge, 327 Mo. 767,
38 S.W.2d 1029 (1931).
37. Lakeman v. LaFrance, 102 N.H. 300, 156 A.2d 123 (1959).
38. Alabama and Connecticut allowed the contract statute for actions of assumpsit
before they enacted malpractice statutes. See Sellers v. Noah, 209 Ala. 103, 95 So. 167(1923) ; Hickey v. Slattery, 103 Conn. 716, 131 A. 558 (1926).
39. See, e.g., Seanor v. Browne, 154 Okla. 222, 7 P.2d 627 (1932).
40. This applies to those jurisdictions where substance determines the nature of
the action. A contract remedy is of course available where form is considered.
41. See Lillich, The Malpractice Statute of Limitations in New York and Other
Jurisdictions, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 339, 362 (1962):
The great difficulty with many of the cases, even in states having malpractice
statutes of limitations, is the failure to make an articulate distinction between
ordinary, implied physician-patient contracts and special or express contracts, i.e.
where the physician warrants a cure and thereby raises his duty above the ordi-
nary standard.
42. Note, 16 ST. JOHN'S L. Rtv. 101, 104 (1941).
43. See generally Miller, The Contractual Liability of Physicians and Surgeons,
1953 WASH. U.L.Q. 413.
44. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 21 (1958) : "The following must be commenced within six
years; . . . (8) Motions and other actions against attorneys at law, for failure to pay
over money of their clients, or for neglect or omission of duty."
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in every state except Tennessee where it was held in Bland v. Smith45
that where the plaintiff brought an action for the defendant attorney's
alleged negligence in the conduct of a divorce action and alleged "pain
and mental anguish," the one year statute for personal injuries would
be applied. The court further stated that the six year contract limita-
tion would be applied only in cases in which the whole basis of recovery
was contract and where no allegations of personal injury had been made.
In all other jurisdictions, where the substance of the action con-
trols, it is apparent that the nature of the attorney-client relationship
sometimes dictates application of the contract statute of limitations; this
is due in some measure to the fact that in the business context of the
relationship the parties are more likely to think in terms of specific
tasks to be performed and to reach an understanding on the essential
terms of their agreement. This is in contrast to the normal physician-
patient relationship, which usually involves a long-term, general course
of examination and, if necessary, treatment. Thus, in Alter v. Michael,"
the California Supreme Court held that although medical malpractice
sounded in tort and was subject to a one-year limitation," actions for
legal malpractice were governed by the two-year contract statute.4 s
Since a malpractice statute generally provides the shortest limita-
tion period, attorneys and accountants usually contend that it should
be applied in suits against them, whether the action is in implied
contract or tort. In Galloway v. Hood,49 the Ohio court accepted this
contention and applied the one-year malpractice statute in an action
against an attorney. In an earlier decision, 50 the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, applying the law of New York, had reached a
contrary conclusion in a similar situation: "[The malpractice] statute
only applies to wrongs to the person, and does not affect attorneys
at law who have negligently conducted a litigation. Furthermore,
if 'malpractice' were construed to include injuries to property caused
by unskillful professional management, many claims, as in this case,
would be barred before they were discovered." 5 ' The court further
stated that: "[T]he present action is either for a breach of the contract
of retainer, or for an injury to property. In either case, Section 48
of the Civil Practice Act applies, and the period of limitation is six
years."5 2 It is probably a safe assumption that a malpractice statute
which does not specifically enumerate the particular classes of practi-
45. 197 Tenn. 683, 277 S.W.2d 377 (1955).
46. 64 Cal. 2d 480, 413 P.2d 153, 50 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1966).
47. See Huysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal. 2d 302, 57 P.2d 908 (1936), cited by the court
in Alter v. Michael, stating that medical malpractice, as a tort, is subject to the one-
year limitation. The Alter court also noted, "[a]rguments that discrimination results in
favor of doctors and against lawyers should be addressed to the Legislature and not
to the courts." 64 Cal. 2d 480, 413 P.2d at 155, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
48. See Marchand v. Miazza, 151 So. 2d 372 (Ct. App. La. 1963), where the court
stated that an action in legal malpractice could be predicated on either contract or tort.
49. 69 Ohio App. 278, 43 N.E.2d 631 (1941).
50. O'Neill v. Gray, 30 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1929).
51. Id. at 778.
52. Id. at 779.
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tioners 5 to which it applies is more likely to be construed to include
attorneys5 4 than one which is specific and on its face does not appear to
include attorneys." In the absence of an applicable malpractice statute,
the limitation period, as in medical cases, will usually be the shorter
tort statute; however, because of the nature of the relationship, courts
may be more receptive to allegations of contract.
There is a distinct paucity of cases involving limitations in suits
against accountants. The accountant's situation is much more analogous
to that of attorneys than to that of physicians, and it is probable that
the results will be roughly parallel. In New York, the malpractice
statute has been held inapplicable to accountants in Fed. Int'l. Banking
Co. v. Touche5 6 In addition, in Carr v. Lipshie,57 a New York court
refused to apply the contract statute:
Actions for breach of contract have been sustained where a specific
result is guaranteed by the terms of the agreement, but not where
the contracting party either expressly or impliedly promises to per-
form services of the standard generally followed in the profession
or promises to use due care in the performance of the services to
be rendered. The pleading herein does not allege a promise to
accomplish a definite result .... It merely states that the defendants
would perform the services with due care and in accordance with
the recognized and accepted practices of the profession.5
While the language of Carr may seem to indicate otherwise, accountants
are probably more susceptible to the contract statute of limitations than
physicians or attorneys. This is especially true where an accountant
is employed to perform a specific task such as an audit or tax return.
In these expressly delineated situations, the parties are more likely to
reach a "meeting of the minds" than in other, normally long-term, pro-
fessional relationships. Where the relationship is in fact bottomed on
a contract, it is hard to justify a rule which ignores this reality.
53. Five of the seventeen state statutes, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York,
North Dakota, and Ohio, do not specify against whom the action is to be brought;
they merely provide for actions of malpractice. See note 22 supra.
54. Although the common usage of the word "malpractice" connotes a medical
practitioner, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1111 (4th ed. 1951) defines the term as "[a]ny
professional misconduct, unreasonable lack of skill or fidelity in professional or
fiduciary duties, evil practice, or illegal or immoral conduct." Therefore, the general
malpractice statutes could easily be construed to include attorneys.
55. Twelve of the seventeen statutes specify that the action for malpractice applies
to various classes of medical personnel and institutions:
Alabama (physicians, surgeons and dentists); Arkansas (physicians, surgeons,
dentists, hospitals, and sanitaria); Colorado (any person licensed to practice
medicine, chiropractic, osteopathy, chiropody, midwifery, or dentistry) ; Connecti-
cut (physician, surgeon, dentist, chiropodist, chiropractor, hospital or sana-
torium) ; Indiana (physicians, dentists, surgeons, hospitals, sanatorium, or others) ;
Kentucky (physician or surgeon); Maine (physicians and all others engaged in
the healing art) ; Massachusetts (physicians, surgeons, dentists, optometrists,
hospitals and sanatoria) ; Michigan (physicians, surgeons or dentists) ; Minnesota(physicians, surgeons, dentists, hospitals, sanitariums) ; Missouri (physicians,
surgeons, dentists, roentgenologists, nurses, hospitals and sanitariums); South
Dakota (physician, surgeon, dentist, hospital or sanitarium). See note 22 supra.
56. 248 N.Y. 517, 162 N.E. 507 (1928).
57. 8 App. Div. 2d 330, 187 N.Y.S.2d 564 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
58. Id. at 332, 187 N.Y.S.2d at 567. Contra, L.P. Laboratories, Inc. v. Mitchell,
39 Cal. 2d 56, 244 P.2d 385 (1952).
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COMMENCING THE RUNNING OF THE STATUTE
The most crucial determination to be made, once the applicable
statute has been selected, is when the period of limitation begins to
run. The most common statutory language, whether the statute is ex-
pressly for malpractice or has been construed to apply to it, is that the
limitation period begins to run when the cause of action accrues. Only
seven statutes specify when this point is reached.59
In medical cases, the traditional approach6" was that the cause of
action accrued, and the statute began to run, at the time of the negligent
act."' Although such a rule may impose harsh consequences on plain-
tiffs, this approach is consistent with the policy of protecting defendants
from stale claims. In addition, its application is relatively easy from an
administrative standpoint. Approximately twenty states subscribe to
this theory to some degree, two by statute.6 2
Because of the unfairness of this rule to many plaintiffs, it is under
constant, often unsuccessful, attack in most jurisdictions. For example,
Massachusetts had adopted the rule in Cappuci v. Barone.63 In reaching
its decision, the court's rationale was typical of jurisdictions which
utilize the negligent act standard: "The damage sustained by the wrong
done is not the cause of action; and the statute is a bar to the original
cause of action although the damages may be nominal, and to all the
consequential damages resulting from it though such damages may be
substantial and not foreseen."64 Pasquale v. Chandler5 marked the last
unsuccessful attempt to overthrow this standard in Massachusetts. As
the basis for its decision, the court cited the legislative history of the
pertinent statute, which indicated a "reaffirmation and strengthening of
59. The date when the injury was sustained: DEL. COD. ANN. tit. 10, § 8118
(Supp. 1960), and PA. STAr. ANN. tit. 12, § 34 (1953) ; when the injury is or should
have been discovered: Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 516.100, 140 (1952), ALA. CoDs tit. 7,
§ 25(1) (1960), and CONN. GXN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584 (1958); the date of the
negligent act: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-205 (1947), and IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-627
(1946). It should be noted that the dates of injury and of the negligent act may or
may not be the same. For example, in Hahn v. Claybrook, 130 Md. 198, 100 A. 86
(1917), the doctor negligently issued a prescription in 1904, but there was no injury
until 1908. See note 101 infra and accompanying text
60. In the older cases and writings on this subject, this rule is designated as the
majority rule. In view of the present state of the law, however, this would no longer
be accurate. See notes 61-80 infra and accompanying text.
61. Summers v. Wallace Hosp., 276 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1960) ; Tessier v. United
States, 269 F.2d 305 (1st Cir. 1959); Saffold v. Scarborough, 191 Ga. App. 628,
86 S.E.2d 649 (1955) ; Gangloff v. Apfelbach, 319 Ill. App. 596, 49 N.E.2d 795 (1943) ;
Ogg v. Robb, 181 Iowa 145, 162 N.W. 217 (1917); Waddell v. Woods, 160 Kan. 481,
163 P.2d 348 (1945); Carter v. Harlan Hospital Ass'n, 265 Ky. 452, 97 S.W.2d 9
(1936); Cappuci v. Barone, 266 Mass. 578, 165 N.E. 653 (1919) ; Wilder v. St.
Joseph Hospital, 255 Miss. 42, 82 So. 2d 651 (1955) ; Lewis v. Shaver, 236 N.C. 510,
73 S.E.2d 320 (1952) ; DeLong v. Campbell, 157 Ohio St. 22, 104 N.E.2d 177 (1952) ;
Hinkle v. Hargens, 76 S.D. 520, 81 N.W.2d 888 (1957) ; Bodne v. Austin, 156 Tenn.
366, 2 S.W.2d 104 (1928); Peteler v. Robison, 81 Utah 535, 17 P.2d 244 (1932);
Murray v. Allen, 103 Vt. 373, 154 A. 678 (1931) ; Lindquist v. Mullen, 45 Wash. 2d
675, 277 P.2d 724 (1954) ; Gray v. Wright, 142 W. Va. 490, 96 S.E.2d 671 (1957);
Lotten v. O'Brien, 146 Wis. 248, 131 N.W. 361 (1911).
62. See notes 59 & 61 supra.
63. 266 Mass. 578, 165 N.E. 653 (1919).
64. Id. at 581, 165 N.E. at 655 (emphasis added).
65. 350 Mass. 450, 215 N.E.2d 319 (1966).
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what has been the legislative policy in the years since the Cappuci
case."66
Although direct attack on the traditional rule has often been unsuc-
cessful, courts have utilized several methods to effectively circumvent
it. The continuing treatment theory has been used when the negli-
grent act was part of a continuing course of treatment by the de-
fendant. Led by Ohio in Gillette v. Tucker,67 this theory prevents the
statute from running until the relationship between physician and patient
ceases for the illness in question. The logical bases for the theory have
been succinctly stated in the following terms:
The continuous treatment theory is generally rationalized on one
or more of three grounds: (1) the treatment of an ailment must
be considered as a whole; (2) the failure to rectify the negligent
act constituting malpractice is really continuing negligence giving
rise to a single cause of action; and (3) the patient, while the treat-
ment continues, relies completely on his physician and is under no
duty to inquire into the effectiveness of the latter's measures. No
matter what its justification, the theory remains an attempt to
ameliorate in certain situations the potentially harsh result of the
majority accrual rule. 68
Applied in at least fourteen jurisdictions,69 the continuing treatment
theory, while helpful in some cases, is far from a panacea. It will not, of
course, help the plaintiff who sues for an isolated incident of negligence,
nor will it afford relief where the injury cannot reasonably be discovered
until after limitations have run.70
It has been widely held, in avoiding the traditional rule, that a
fraudulent concealment of the negligent act would suspend the running
of the statute of limitations until the plaintiff discovers or reasonably
66. 350 Mass. 450, 215 N.E.2d at 323. House Bill 530, a proposed amendment to
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 260, § 4 (Supp. 1966) would have substituted the language
"... shall be commenced only within two years next after the injured party hasknowledge of the facts which give rise to a cause of action but only within five years
after the cause of action accrues." This was defeated, and Senate Bill 924 was adopted
which left the existing law unchanged except for an extension of the limitation period
from two to three years.
67. 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902).
68. Lillich, The Malpractice Statute of Limitations In New York and Other
Jurisdictions, 47 CORNxLL L.Q. 339, 361 (1962).
69. See Burton v. Tribble, 189 Ark. 58. 70 S.W.2d 503 (1934) ; Myers v. Steven-
son, 125 Cal. App. 2d 99, 270 P.2d 885 (1954) ; Silvertooth v. Shallenberger, 49 Ga.App. 758, 176 S.E. 829 (1934) ; Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241 Md. 137, 215 A.2d 825(1966) ; DeHaar v. Winter, 258 Mich. 293, 241 N.W. 923 (1932) ; Couillard v. CharlesT. Miller Hosp., Inc., 253 Minn. 418, 92 N.W.2d 96 (1958); Thatcher v. DeTar,
351 Mo. 603, 173 S.W.2d 760 (1943) ; Williams v. Elias, 140 Neb. 656, 1 N.W.2d 121(1941) ; Tortorello v. Reinfeld, 6 N.J. 58, 77 A.2d 240 (1950) ; Sly v. Van Lengen,120 Misc. 420, 198 N.Y.S. 608 (Sup. Ct. 1923) ; Hotelling v. Walther, 169 Ore. 559,130 P.2d 944 (1942) ; Peteler v. Robison, 81 Utah 335, 17 P.2d 244 (1932) ; Murray v.Allen, 103 Vt. 373, 154 A. 678 (1931). The continuing treatment rule was expressly
rejected in Giambozi v. Peters, 127 Conn. 380, 16 A.2d 833 (1940) (requires negligent
treatment) ; Gangloff v. Apfelbach, 919 11. App. 596, 49 N.E.2d 795 (1943) ; Hill v.Hays, 193 Kan. 453, 395 P.2d 298 (1964) ; Shearin v. Lloyd, 246 N.C. 363, 98 S.E.2d
508 (1957) ; and McCoy v. Stevens, 182 Wash. 55, 44 P.2d 797 (1935).
70. DeLong v. Campbell, 157 Ohio St. 22, 104 N.E.2d 177 (1952).
[VOL. XXVIII
GADDIS V. SMITH, ATKINS V. CROSLAND
should discover the negligence. 7 The elements which must be proved
in a medical malpractice case do not differ from those which must be
established in traditional cases of fraud.72 For this reason, this exten-
sion of the accrual date is virtually useless, since, with the exception
of those states which impute knowledge to the defendant,13 the burden
of proving scienter is extremely heavy.
The "discovery" test presents the most controversial, and perhaps
most reasonable, approach to determining the time when a statute of
limitations begins to run. It is presently in force in twenty-two juris-
dictions,7 4 three by statute.75 After an exhaustive Study of the question,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey, in Fernandi v. Strully,76 accepted the
discovery rule for cases in which a physician has negligently left a
foreign object in his patient's body. The manifest unfairness of any
other conclusion was apparent to the majority:
Here the lapse of time does not entail the damage of a false or
frivolous claim, nor the danger of a speculative or uncertain claim.
The circumstances do not permit the suggestion that Mrs. Fernandi
may have knowingly slept on her rights but, on the contrary, es-
tablish that the cause of action was unknown and unknowable to
her shortly before she instituted suit. Justice cries out that she
fairly be afforded a day in court and it appears evident to us that
this may be done, at least in this highly confined type of case, with-
out any undue impairment of the two year limitation or the con-
siderations of repose which underlie it. If, as is to be hoped, the
71. See, Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 368, 400 (1961). See also Dawson, Fraudulent
Concealment and Statutes of Limitation, 31 MxcH. L. REV. 875 (1933).
72. See generally W. PROSSgR, ToRTs 697 (3d ed. 1964). Two of the require-
ments in medical malpractice are scienter: see, e.g., Carter v. Harlan Hosp. Ass'n,
265 Ky. 452, 97 S.W.2d 9 (1936) ; Gray v. Wright, 142 W. Va. 490, 96 S.E.2d 671
(1957); Saffold v. Scarborough, 91 Ga. App. 628, 86 S.E.2d 649 (1955): and
affirmative acts or statements: see Pickett v. Aglinsky, 110 F.2d 628 (4th Cir. 1940) ;
Buchanan v. Kull, 323 Mich. 381, 35 N.W.2d 351 (1949). Affirmative acts or
statements may not be necessary, however. Guy v. Schuldt, 236 Ind. 101, 138 N.E.2d
891 (1956) ; Hinkle v. Hargens, 76 S.D. 520, 81 N.W.2d 888 (1957).
73. Recently, some courts have been willing to charge the defendant with con-
structive knowledge. See, e.g., Morrison v. Acton, 68 Ariz. 27, 198 P.2d 590 (1948);
Crossett Health Center v. Croswell, 221 Ark. 874, 256 S.W.2d 548 (1953).
74. See Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949) ; Kossick v. United States, 330
F.2d 933 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 837 (1964); United States v. Reid,
251 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1958) ; Kuhne v. United States, 250 F. Supp. 523 (E.D. Tenn.
1965) ; Stafford v. Schultz, 42 Cal. 2d 767, 270 P.2d 1 (1954) ; Weinstock v. Eissler,
224 Cal. App. 2d 212, 36 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1964) ; Davis v. Bonebrake, 135 Colo. 506,
313 P.2d 982 (1957) ; City of Miami v. Brooks, 70 So. 2d 306 (Sup. Ct. Fla. 1954) ;
Billings v. Sisters of Mercy, 86 Idaho 485, 389 P.2d 224 (1964) ; Springer v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 169 So. 2d 171 (La. Ct. App. 1964); Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241
Md. 137, 215 A.2d 825 (1966) ; Hahn v. Claybrook, 130 Md. 179, 100 A. 83 (1917),;
Johnson v. Caldwell, 371 Mich. 368, 123 N.W.2d 785 (1963) ; Johnson v. St. Patrick's
Hosp., 417 P.2d 469 (Sup. Ct. Mont. 1966); Spath v. Morrow, 174 Neb. 38, 115
N.W.2d 581 (1962); Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961); Nowell
v. Hamilton, 249 N.C. 523, 107 S.E.2d 112 (1959); Seitz v. Jones, 370 P.2d 300
(Sup. Ct. Okla. 1961) ; Berry v. Branner, 421 P.2d 996 (Sup. Ct. Ore. 1966) ; Ayers
v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959); Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577
(Sup. Ct. Tex. 1967); Morgan v. Grace Hosp., Inc., 144 S.E.2d 156 (W. Va. 1965).
75. ALA. Cone tit. 7, § 25(1) (1958) ; CONN. GrN. STAT. § 52-584 (1958) ; ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.1 (Smith-Hurd 1966) ; Mo. RXv. STAT. §§ 516.140 and 516.100
(1949).
76. 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961).
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resulting jeopardy to defendants produces a greater measure of
care in connection with surgical operations, so much the better. 77
Almost all the courts which have adopted the discovery test acknowledge
the unsoundness of the traditional rule.
It simply places an undue strain upon common sense, reality, logic
and simple justice to say that a cause of action had "accrued" to
the plaintiff until the X-ray examination disclosed a foreign object
within her abdomen and until she had reasonable basis for believing
or reasonable means of ascertaining that the foreign object was
within her abdomen as a consequence of the negligent performance
of the hysterectomy.7 8
At least one judge has gone so far as to intimate that without the dis-
covery test, statutes of limitations would be unconstitutional as a depri-
vation of due process of law.79 Whether or not this is the case, it is
obvious that the discovery test is a potent force today and will continue
to grow.
Cases of attorney malpractice illustrate a similar divergence of
opinion on a much smaller scale. The rule that the period of limitation
begins at the time of the negligent act is more widely applied in such
cases."0 One possible, albeit unfortunate, reason for this is the fact thatlawyers, realizing the potential implications of a change of the rule, have
not pressed claims with as much vigor as in other areas which do not di-
rectly affect them. Circumvention of the rule has been attempted, how-
ever; a variation of the continuing treatment rule was applied to at-
torney malpractice in Ohio in McWilliams v. Hackett."' The court held,
in an action for malpractice against an attorney, that the cause of action
accrued and the statute began to run when the contract of employment
was terminated. This was subsequently overruled in Galloway v.
Hood s2 in which the court stated that the continuing treatment doctrine
applied only in medical cases.
The discovery rule seems to be gaining a foothold in a small num-
ber of jurisdictions. In Marchand v. Miazza,83 the Court of Appeals
of Louisiana, after noting that a claim against an attorney might sound
in contract or tort, stated: "Treating it as one predicated upon tort,
77. 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d at 286.
78. Morgan v. Grace Hosp., Inc., 144 S.E.2d 156, 161 (W. Va. 1965).
79. See concurring opinion of Judge McBride in Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282,
294, 154 A.2d 788, 794 (1959):
Statutes of limitations must be read in the light of this provision ["dueprocess" clause of Pennsylvania constitution] for the running of time is not the
only test of validity of such statutes. They are desirable in that they prevent
oppression by forbidding plaintiffs to litigate stale claims and thus compeldefense at a time when such defense is no longer practicable and sometimes evenimpossible. Nevertheless, the restrictions imposed may not be so arbitrary as topreclude a reasonable opportunity for one who has been harmed to make his
claim. If the legislature were permitted absolute discretion it would not be
merely regulating the remedy but would be abolishing it.
80. See generally Annot., 118 A.L.R. 215 (1939).
81. 19 Ohio App. 416 (1923).
82. 69 Ohio App. 278, 43 N.E.2d 631 (1941). See notes 67-70 supra and accom-
panying text.
83. 151 So. 2d 372 (La. 1963).
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we do not think the one year would begin to run until the damages
have been shown to exist." 4 An exception to the traditional rule was
expressed in Jensen v. Sprigg,"5 in which the court stated that a cause
of action for defendant's delay which resulted in a judgment against
plaintiff accrued "when the delay resulted in damages or injury to
plaintiff. '8 6 The latest case to reach the question of limitations in at-
torney malpractice was Fort-Myers Seafood Packers, Inc. v. Steptoe &
Johnson.87 In that case, the defendant was directed by a client to send
plaintiff a draft of a proposed contract to be used in connection with a
business venture with a third party in Venezuela. Due to plaintiff's
reliance on defendant's misstatement of Venezuelan law relating to the
registry of fishing vessels, the plaintiff's boats were impounded while
fishing for shrimp in Venezuelan territorial water. The three year stat-
ute of limitations8" would have run if the cause of action had accrued
when plaintiff received the contract, but the action was brought within
three years of the impounding of the boats, 9 which was the date of the
injury, and thus was timely if the cause of action was deemed to accrue
at the impounding date. The trial court9 ° held that a cause of action
accrued on the earlier date and granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment. Reversing, the Circuit Court of Appeals relied on Hanna v.
Fletcher,9 a case of neligence by a landlord, which held: "The action
against [defendant] plainly is based on negligence, sounds in tort, and
did not accrue until injury resulted from the alleged negligence. 9 2
Although the statement of the Fort-Myers court that "[w]e see no
good reason for drawing such a distinction between malpractice suits
and other negligence actions"9 8 is logical and in keeping with the trend
in medical cases, it is possible that some impetus for this conclusion
was the vulnerability of plaintiff's attorney to a subsequent malpractice
action based on his delay in instituting suit. In any case, this movement
away from the rule that a cause of action accrues on the date of the
negligent act is reflective of a general desire to facilitate a day in court
for genuinely injured plaintiffs.
Although seldom litigated with respect to accountants, recent cases
exhibit movement toward more liberal rules. Atkins represents, at the
very least, a shift away from the date of the negligent act as the starting
point for the statute of limitations.94 In Moonie v. Lynch,95 on a very
84. Id. at 375.
85. 84 Cal. App. 519, 258 P. 683 (1927).
86. 84 Cal. App. 519, 258 P. at 686.
87. 381 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
88. D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-301 (Supp. V, 1966).
89. The contract was mailed to plaintiff on May 16, 1962, the boats were im-
pounded on July 25, 1962, and this suit was filed on July 22, 1965.
90. Fort Myers Seafood Packers, Inc. v. Steptoe & Johnson, 253 F. Supp. 626
(D.D.C. 1966).
91. 231 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 989 (1956).
92. Id. at 472.
93. 381 F.2d at 262.
94. See CONCLUSION infra.
95. 64 Cal. Rptr. 55 (Ct. App. 1967).
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similar set of facts, an intermediate appellate court in California adopted
the discovery test in an action against an accountant.
The circumstances of this case (assuming that the allegations of
the cross-complaint are true and that defendant filed this action
within two years of the discovery of the alleged negligence, or the
time when with reasonable diligence he should have discovered it)
cry aloud for a rule which would not have required defendant to
have brought his action in a period before he could have known
that plaintiff had been negligent and that he, the defendant, had
been injured.
We, therefore, hold that in a malpractice action against an ac-
countant the statute of limitations does not run until the negligent
act is discovered, or with reasonable diligence could have been
discovered.9 6
Read as part of the over-all trend in malpractice cases, it is apparent
that the retreat from the traditional position in accountancy cases is
based on the same fundamental policy considerations as those present
in the other more widely contested areas of professional malpractice.
THE SITUATION IN MARYLAND
In malpractice actions in Maryland, the initial problem of deter-
mining which statute of limitations is applicable does not arise since
the limitations statute encompasses both tort and contract actions :9
"[A]ll actions ... of assumpsit, or on the case.., shall be commenced,
sued or issued within three years from the time the cause of action
accrued ... ."98
Obviously, then, the date of the cause of action's accrual is the
crucial determination which must be made by a Maryland court. 99
Maryland seems to have moved away from the traditional approach
to this issue.1° In professional malpractice, the earliest case to rule
on this question was Hahn v. Claybrook,' in which the court appar-
96. Id. at 58.
97. For a discussion of the form of action problem in Maryland, in a dental mal-
practice case, see McClees v. Cohen, 158 Md. 60, 62-64, 148 A. 124, 125-26 (1930).
98. MD. CODt ANN. art. 57, § 1 (1964 repl. vol.): "Limitations of Actions."
This article also provides that " ... actions of assault, battery and wounding .. .[shall be brought] within one year from the time the cause of action accrued."
Professional malpractice, sounding in negligence, is not included in this section. SeeMcClees v. Cohen, 158 Md. 60, 148 A. 124 (1930); Angulo v. Hallar, 137 Md. 227,
112 A. 179 (1920) ; Dashiell v. Griffith, 84 Md. 363, 35 A. 1094 (1896).
99. This question has long been the subject of litigation in Maryland. The
earliest statement of the accrual rule was Young v. Mackall, 3 Md. Ch. 399, 408(1850): "[Sloon as the cause of action accrued, whether it be the case of a trust
or not, if it be a fit subject for a suit at law as well as in equity, the statute of limita-
tions begins to run."
100. Although the position was not completely clarified until 1966, at least one
writer has maintained that Maryland was the first state to adopt the discovery test.
See Note, The Statute of Limitations in Actions for Undiscovered Malpractice, 12
Wyo. L.J. 30, 34 (1957).
101. 130 Md. 179, 100 A. 83 (1917).
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ently enunciated the discovery rule."° In that case, between 1904 and
1910 the defendant doctor negligently prescribed a drug for the plain-
tiff which, beginning in 1908, caused skin discoloration in the form of
bluishness appearing intermittently around the fingernails, lips and nose.
Although the physician-patient relationship was terminated in 1910,
plaintiff continued to take the drug. The condition was at its worst in
1913; suit was filed in 1915. The court held that the cause of action
accrued in 1908 when plaintiff first noticed, or reasonably should have
noticed, her injury. Since this was more than three years before the
institution of suit, the action was barred. "The ground of the cause
of action in this case was the discoloration of the plaintiff's skin by
the use of the drug called argentum oxide, and the statute began to
run from the time of the discovery of the alleged injury therefrom. '
While the court thus apparently enunciated the discovery test for
Maryland," 4 the opinion contains confusing dictum to the contrary.' °5
The intent of the Hahn court may perhaps be discovered by con-
sideration of Washington, Baltimore & Annapolis Electric Railroad
Co. v. Moss,'06 decided by the same court in the same term. Plaintiff,
a broker, brought an action of assumpsit to recover for services ren-
dered in securing a lease for the defendants. The court was obviously
dissatisfied with the prospect of allowing the statute to run on a cause
of action for which there would otherwise be no suitable remedy. In
holding the action was not barred, the court cited with approval
25 Cyc. 1065:
The accrual of the cause of action means a right to institute and
maintain a suit; and whenever one person may sue another a cause
of action has accrued and the statute begins to run .... The statute
does not attach to a claim for which there is no right of action,
102. The Hahn holding was, however, misconstrued in Pickett v. Aglinsky, 110
F.2d 628, 630 (4th Cir. 1940): "The fact that the actual or substantial damages were
not discovered or did not occur until later is of no consequence. . . . This rule is
generally followed in applying statutes of limitations to actions for malpractice of
physicians and surgeons. [citing Hahn v. Claybrook]." This misconstruction appar-
ently resulted from the conclusion that the action in Hahn was barred because the
cause of action accrued at the time of the negligent prescription. In fact, however, it
was barred because the plaintiff discovered the injury in 1908, seven years before the
institution of suit. 130 Md. at 187, 100 A. at 86. For correct constructions of Hahn,
see note 117 infra.
103. 130 Md. at 187, 100 A. at 86.
104. Although it too would have precluded recovery, the court of appeals could
have based the Hahn decision on the continuing treatment theory which had been
promulgated fifteen years earlier by the Ohio court in Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St.
106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902). See note 67 supra and accompanying text. Since the court
cited other cases from foreign jurisdictions, it might be concluded that the continuing
treatment rule was not considered.
105. 130 Md. at 182, 100 A. at 84:
The general rule, in cases of neglect of duty arising from contract and the
breach of a professional duty by a physician, surgeon, or an attorney is held to
fall within this rule, and is correctly stated and supported by authority in 25 Cyc.
1116, as follows: "In cases of negligent performance of a contract or neglect of
some duty imposed by contract, the cause of action accrues and the statute begins
to run from the time of the breach or neglect, not from the time when conse-
quential damages result or become ascertained; for the cause of action is founded
on the breach of duty, not on the consequential damage, and the subsequent
accrual or ascertainment of such damage gives no new cause of action."
106. 130 Md. 198, 100 A. 86 (1917).
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and does not run against a right for which there is no correspond-
ing remedy or for which judgment cannot be obtained. The true
test therefore to determine whether a cause of action has accrued
is to ascertain the time when plaintiff could have first have [sic]
maintained his action to a successful result. The fact that he might
have brought a premature or groundless action is immaterial. 1°'
Read in conjunction with Hahn, the cited language, taking into account
the use of the word "premature," seems to indicate that a cause of action
will accrue only when the plaintiff could obtain relief commensurate
with the injury. That he could technically maintain an action before he
has suffered compensable damage is irrelevant and will not commence
the running of the statute.
Ten years later, in Chestertown Bank v. Perkins,'"8 the court again
appeared to apply the discovery test, once more in a non-malpractice
area. In a mistaken belief as to an estate's solvency, the executrix made
full payments on notes to the defendant bank in 1921 and 1922. In
1924, a final accounting revealed the insolvency and the fact that the
payments to the defendant actually represented an overpayment of
$1822 more than its pro rata share. The suit to recover these overpay-
ments was filed in 1926, five years after they had been made. The de-
fendant claimed that the statute began to run in 1921, but the court
held that it did not commence until discovery of the error.
The executrix at the time of the payments of said notes was of the
honest belief, as alleged in the bill, that the estate was solvent,
and not until she had knowledge, acquired after proper effort and
diligence on her part, or actual or constructive knowledge of the
insolvency of the estate, and the fact that she had overpaid the
appellant, could she sue to recover such overpayments, and it was
not until such time, at the earliest, that any right of action accrued
to her, to recover from the appellant the overpayments made to him.
And if, as alleged in the bill, she had no knowledge of such insol-
vency until the 20th day of May, 1924, the debt sued for was not
barred by the statute at the time of the institution of the suit on
the 25th day of November, 1926."09
In the recent case of Waldman v. Rohrbaugh,'" an action was
brought in September, 1964, for alleged negligence in an operation per-
formed in June, 1961, and in subsequent treatment of plaintiff's ankle.
The defendant doctor filed, inter alia, a plea of limitations and later,
"not realizing that they had strayed from customary surroundings in
the District of Columbia into Maryland,"'' a Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings. This device is not provided for in the Maryland rules,
although it is authorized by Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. Judge Shook, shaken by "the same federal virus that felled
107. Id. at 205, 100 A. at 89 (emphasis added).
108. 154 Md. 456, 140 A. 834 (1927).
109. Id. at 461, 140 A. at 836.
110. 241 Md. 137, 215 A.2d 825 (1966).
111. Id. at 138, 215 A.2d at 826.
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counsel for the doctor,""12 heard arguments on the motion and granted
it on the basis of limitations. While holding that the proceedings should
be remanded under Maryland Rule 871 because of the procedural defect,
the court engaged in extensive dictum on the substantive question of
limitations. The complaint set out a claim based on the continuing
treatment theory, although at trial the plaintiff relied on the discovery
test. After a review of the trend of national authority, the court ap-
proved both rules. In support of the continuing treatment rule the court
cited two Maryland cases" 3 and then stated:
In our view, if the facts show continuing medical or surgical treat-
ment for a particular illness or condition in the course of which
there is malpractice producing or aggravating harm, the cause of
action of the patient accrues at the end of the treatment for that
particular illness, injury or condition, unless the patient sooner
knew or should have known of the injury or harm, in which case
the statute would start to run with actual or constructive knowl-
edge.1 4
In enunciating, or re-affirming the discovery test for Maryland, where
no continuing treatment relation exists, the court noted that Hahn had
almost uniformly been interpreted to state the discovery test." 5 In
concluding, the court stated:
On reason and principle and the authority of Hahn and cases
of like import elsewhere which have been cited and referred to, we
conclude that the right of action for injury or damage from mal-
practice may accrue when the plaintiff knows or should know he
has suffered injury or damage. In many cases he will or should
know at the time or soon after the wrongful act that he has been
the victim of negligent care; in other settings of fact it may be
impossible for him, as a layman, unskilled in medicine, reasonably
to understand or appreciate that actionable harm has been done
him. If this is fairly the fact, we think he should have the statutory
time from the moment of discovery, the moment he knows or
should know he has a cause of action, within which to sue." 6
Although there are no cases specifically dealing with attorneys or ac-
countants, the discovery test has been applied in other areas,"' and it
seems entirely likely that the court of appeals would extend its applica-
tion to all cases of professional malpractice.
112. Id. at 139, 215 A.2d at 826.
113. Vincent v. Palmer, 179 Md. 365, 374, 19 A.2d 183, 189 (1941) ; Washington
B. & A. Elec. R.R. Co. v. Moss, 130 Md. 198, 204-05, 100 A. 86, 89 (1917).
114. 241 Md. at 142, 215 A.2d at 828.
115. D. LoulsxLu & H. WILLIAMS, TRIAL O MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES § 13.07(1960) ; Note, The Statute of Limitations in Actions for Undiscovered Malpractice,
12 Wyo. L.J. 30 (1957). This is not completely true, however. See note 102 supra.
116. 241 Md. at 145, 215 A.2d at 830.
117. See, e.g., Southern Maryland Oil Co. v. Texas Co., 203 F. Supp. 449 (D. Md.
1962) (suit on indemnity claim) ; Northwest Airlines v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 161 F.
Supp. 452 (D. Md. 1958) (suit on indemnity claim); Callahan v. Clemens, 184 Md.
520, 41 A.2d 473 (1945) (negligent erection of a wall).
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CONCLUSION
Because of the numerous exceptions to the traditional rule that
a cause of action accrues, and the statute begins to run, at the time of
commission of the negligent act, it is apparent that this traditional rule
no longer represents the majority position. In their efforts to give
effect to the policy of affording relief to wronged plaintiffs, however,
the courts have been somewhat less than consistent. In addition to the
variations of application from state to state, courts have failed in some
instances to establish viable rules which would apply uniformly to all
professional malpractice cases within their jurisdiction. The instant
cases present such a situation. While the court in both Gaddis and
Atkins obviously recognized the impropriety of a rule of law which
would bar a valid claim before it could reasonably have been maintained,
it did not, in fact, establish a uniform rule. Gaddis articulated the dis-
covery test in medical malpractice cases where a foreign object had been
negligently left in a patient's body. In Atkins, since the date of the in-
jury, the assessment of tax, coincided with the earliest possible time
of discovery, the result under either test would have been the same. The
court, however, framed its opinion in terms of the date of injury, and
since this date will not always coincide with the date of discovery, these
two cases have seemingly created the anomalous situation of two differ-
ent rules flowing from the same policy consideration. Although this
result may not have been intended by the Texas court, it is to be hoped
that as other courts re-examine their approaches to statute of limita-
tions determinations, they will uniformly apply the discovery test to all
cases of professional malpractice and thereby avoid reaching: con-
flicting results.
